Guardian vs Validating Agent — Design Decision

Spec Version: 1.0
Author: Bob
Date: 2026-04-17
Status: Resolved
References: aegis-chain-design.md, issue #11


Decision: Ship Later, Keep in Design

Do not block testnet on Guardians. The single-agent screening layer already provides first-line defense. Add Guardian as a distinct concept in v1 if measurable gap emerges.


What We Already Have

The Aegis design already describes a two-tier screening architecture:

Tx submitted
    │
    ▼
┌──────────────┐
│ Single agent │ ◄── First line: address/contract behavioral profile
│ screening    │     Latency target: <100ms
└──────┬───────┘
       │
       ├── Normal ──► Execute
       │
       └── Suspicious ──► Escalate to validator set
                              │
                        Multi-agent vote (1-2s)
                        Threshold: >2/3 flag → pause/reject

This first-line screening is the Guardian role. It just wasn't named that way.


What Clark's "Guardian" Adds

Clark's spec formalizes the Guardian as:

Guardian Property Aegis Equivalence Status
Opt-in per user Not yet designed Open
~50ms response budget <100ms already spec'd Align
Local/TEE preferred Own model, BYO Align
Co-signs UserOps (EIP-4337) Not designed Ship later
Stake/bond Not in v0 Ship later

The EIP-4337 integration and per-user opt-in are the new parts. Everything else is already in the existing design under "single-agent screening."


The Real Question: Opt-In or Universal?

Option A — Universal first-line screening (current design)

  • Every tx goes through single-agent screening before hitting the chain
  • No user opt-in needed
  • Validators cover everyone equally
  • Simpler trust model

Option B — Guardian as opt-in RPC replacement

  • Users choose a Guardian agent (like choosing an RPC provider)
  • Guardian monitors that user's addresses specifically
  • Better per-user context
  • Adds trust complexity (which Guardian? what if it misbehaves?)

Decision: Option A for v0. Universal first-line screening means Guardians don't add trust assumptions to the base protocol. We can add opt-in Guardian layer on top later without changing the core.


Revised Transaction Flow

Tx submitted
    │
    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│  First-Line Screening (Guardian)      │ ◄── Built into protocol
│  Single agent, <100ms                   │     All txs pass through
└──────────────┬───────────────────────┘
               │
               ├── Normal ──► Execute
               │
               └── Flagged ──► Validator Set
                                     │
                               Multi-agent vote
                               >2/3 flag → pause/reject

Guardian v1 Scope (Future)

If we add Guardians in a later version:

Guardian = First-Line Screening Agent + Per-User Context + EIP-4337 Co-Signer

User opts in:
  → Selects Guardian agent
  → Guardian monitors their addresses
  → Guardian co-signs UserOps (EIP-4337 AA)
  → Guardian can pause own txs proactively

Protocol never requires Guardians.

Open Questions (Deferred)

  1. EIP-4337 integration: Do we want Guardian co-signing on day one, or add AA support later?
  2. Guardian directory: If users choose Guardians, who runs the directory? How do we prevent Guardian capture?
  3. MEV leakage: If Guardians see txs before submission, can they MEV Extract?
  4. Guardian economics: How do Guardians get paid? Flat fee per monitored address? Fraction of caught exploits?

Conclusion

The Guardian/validator split already exists in the design. The first-line single-agent screening is the Guardian. The naming is a clarification, not a new feature.

The open items in Clark's spec are valid v1+ work but don't block testnet:

  • EIP-4337 integration (later)
  • Per-user opt-in (later)
  • Guardian stake/bond (later)

Recommendation: Close this issue as resolved, add Guardian naming to the design doc, and defer EIP-4337 integration to v1+.


Acceptance Criteria

  • Decision: ship later, Guardians are v1+ work
  • Guardian = first-line screening (already in design)
  • Protocol uses universal first-line, opt-in Guardian on top
  • Update Aegis design doc to use "Guardian" naming
  • EIP-4337 Guardian module (deferred to v1)
  • Guardian threat model (deferred)